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Introduction
Educational attainment is a key factor for understanding why some individuals migrate
and others do not (see, e.g., Borjas 1987). For instance, in most European countries,
individuals with secondary educational attainment display much lower emigration rates
compared with both the primary- or tertiary-educated. Compulsory schooling laws
determine an individual’s minimum level of education, and they thus have the potential
to affect migration. Our article addresses how changes in compulsory schooling laws
affect migration across European countries. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to analyze how compulsory schooling laws affect international migration in a
multicountry setting. Results from our analysis are of particular interest to policymakers
who might be concerned whether and how much of a country’s investments in
education could be lost to “brain drain.”
Our analysis tests how across-country and across-time differences in compulsory
schooling laws influence European migration of affected cohorts, exploiting that
education laws change over time and that hence different cohorts face different lengths
of compulsory schooling in each country. We construct a novel database that contains
information on changes to the length of compulsory education passed between 1950
and 1990 in 31 European countries: all 28 European Union (EU) countries plus
Norway, Liechtenstein, and Macedonia. We merge this database with recent cohort
data on migration flows for 2008–2012. The European setting with basically unre-
stricted labor mobility is ideal for our analysis because it allows us to isolate the role of
education policies.1 Many other countries tend to place stricter limits on the entry of
low-educated compared with highly educated individuals, which makes it difficult to
disentangle the effects of education policies from those of migration restrictions.2
To isolate the effect of compulsory schooling laws in place when a certain cohort
was in school on that cohorts’ migration decisions later in life, we have to control for
other determinants of migration choices that could be correlated with such laws.
Including country, age group, and year fixed effects as well as the interactions of
country and age group with year dummy variables, we are able to account for any
macroeconomic variables that do not vary by age group (e.g., GDP per capita) as well
as cohort-specific factors that influence migration propensities (e.g., different labor
market prospects of young and old individuals). Additionally, the European Union
has 24 official working languages that are quite distinct.3 Aparicio Fenoll and Kuehn
(2016) showed that exposure to foreign language classes during compulsory education
increases migration to countries where these languages are spoken. Hence, reforms to
compulsory education that also alter the particular content of school curricula related to
foreign languages might have an additional and potentially different effect on
1 EU law guarantees free labor mobility, but countries can impose temporary restrictions for nationals of new
member states. Prior to 2014, some EU member states required that Bulgarian and Romanian nationals
obtained residence and work permits. Norway and Liechtenstein belong to the Schengen area, which has
guaranteed free mobility since 2001 and 2011, respectively. Croatia joined the EU only in 2014. Macedonia is
an EU candidate country, and since 2009, its residents can travel visa-free to the Schengen area.
2 For instance, Canada and Australia use a point system that grants visas to more-skilled and higher-educated
individuals; see Aydemir (2011) for an analysis of the selection effects of such systems.
3 Linguists identify at least seven European language families: Celtic, Italic, Germanic, Baltic-Slavik, Greek,
Uralic, and Semitic (see Gray and Atkinson 2003; Harding and Sokal 1988).
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migration. Thus in our estimations, we also control for the fact that certain cohorts in
some countries learned foreign languages during compulsory education but others did
not. Our findings, which thus result from refined comparisons of cohorts, reveal that
one additional year of compulsory schooling reduces migration of affected cohorts in a
given year by 9 %.
One potential explanation for this finding is that increases in the length of compul-
sory schooling shift a significant fraction of the population from low to medium
educational attainment and, as mentioned earlier, emigration rates of medium-educated
individuals are lower compared with those of low-educated individuals in the majority
of European countries (see Fig. S1, Online Resource 1).4 In line with this hypothesis,
we find that additional years of compulsory education effectively translated into higher
average educational attainment. Hence, although this article focuses on the impact of
compulsory schooling laws on migration, our findings also shed light on the more
general question of how educational attainment affects migration. On the other hand,
our analysis has the advantage of allowing for general equilibrium effects of education
policies on migration that go beyond their effect on educational attainment. For
instance, increasing the length of compulsory schooling is likely to improve labor
market opportunities for teachers and might reduce crime rates, given that individuals
are obliged to stay in school for additional years. Such aspects might additionally affect
individuals’ future migration choices.
The validity of our results relies on the exogeneity of education reforms with respect
to migration and educational attainment. Following Lleras-Muney (2002) and Landes
and Solmon (1972), we perform two empirical tests regarding the potential relationship
of compulsory schooling reforms with different socioeconomic variables, migration
out-flows, and educational attainment measured around the time when reforms were
passed. Similar to Aaronson and Mazumder (2011), we also add country-specific birth
cohort trends to our main specification. Our results indicate that European lawmakers
did not pass compulsory education reforms as a reaction to changes in migration rates
or increased educational attainment.
Our study is closely related to literature using education laws and related policies
to estimate the causal effect of education on within-country migration.5 For instance,
Machin et al. (2012) used a change in compulsory schooling laws in Norway and found
education to increase internal mobility. Results for the effect of education on state-to-
state migration in the United States are mixed. Malamud and Wozniak (2010b) used the
risk of being drafted for the Vietnam War as an instrument for college-level education
and estimated a positive causal effect of education on migration. They also found that
when years of schooling were instrumented by quarter of birth, the estimates turned
negative but not significant (Malamud and Wozniak 2010a). As the authors suggested,
if the effect of education on migration depends on individuals’ baseline educational
attainments, such contrasting results might arise. McHenry (2013) used changes to
compulsory schooling laws across U.S. states and showed that for lower levels of
4 For instance, Brunello et al. (2009) provided evidence for a number of European countries for which
compulsory schooling laws significantly affect educational attainment for all but the upper part of the
education distribution.
5 Using data on educational attainment entails problems of reverse causality if individuals’ education choices
are influenced by their desire to migrate. For instance, McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) found that Mexican
boys from a household with international migration experience are more likely to drop out of school.
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education, additional attainment has a negative effect on state-to-state migration,
similar to our findings.6 In the context of international migration, most studies have
used observed educational attainment to predict wages in the destination country.
Taking the number of immigrants as given, their focus has been on the sign of the
selection effect. Results from these studies, all based on Mexican-U.S. migration, have
ranged from negative self-selection of immigrants with individuals from the bottom of
the skill distribution being more likely to migrate (Fernández-Huertas Moraga 2011), to
positive self-selection (Chiquiar and Hanson 2005), to a U-shaped relationship (Caponi
2010).7
Our analysis of how compulsory schooling laws affect international migration is
important because findings regarding the relationship between education policies and
internal mobility cannot simply be extrapolated to the context of international migra-
tion. Within a country, educational attainment is easily transferable, but education
obtained in one country might not be fully recognized in another country (see
Chiswick 2008; Greenwood and McDowell 1991). Furthermore, the degree to which
human capital is transferable across countries tends to depend on foreign language
proficiency. Hence, the relationship between compulsory schooling laws and interna-
tional migration is likely to be governed by a different set of rules. We account for some
of these differences in our estimations by controlling for cohorts’ exposure to foreign
languages during compulsory education and the number of years that cohorts in
different countries have lived in the EU, a relatively integrated labor market that has
recently tried to make at least university degrees comparable across countries.
Estimation Strategy
Our estimation strategy makes use of all three dimensions of variation in the data,
comparing individuals across time, age groups, and countries. We could have estimated
the effects of compulsory schooling laws on migration by comparing individuals only
across age groups, considering different cohorts from the same country who were
affected by different laws. However, such a specification would be affected by differ-
ences in the propensities to migrate by age. Another alternative would have been to
compare individuals of the same age from different countries. However, nationals of
different countries have different propensities to migrate, independently of education
policies. A third approach would be to observe individuals of a certain age and country
at different points in time, using the fact that education laws change over time.
However, because we have data on migration flows for only five years, variability
over time is very limited. But even if we disposed of additional data, migration patterns
6 Regarding a related outcome variable—immigrant assimilation—and using an analysis similar to the current
article, Lleras-Muney and Shertzer (2015) considered changes in education policies, including compulsory
schooling laws and the imposition of English as language of instruction. The authors found no effect of these
policies on migrant assimilation in the United States between 1910 and 1930.
7 Quinn and Rubb (2005) proposed to reconcile these different findings by looking at education-occupation
matches. They found that individuals who work in occupations that require less education are more likely to
migrate, while the opposite is true for individuals whose level of education is below that required for their
occupation. Alternatively, McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) found that the selection effect along educational
lines regarding Mexican-U.S. migration depends on the size of networks, with larger (smaller) networks
attracting disproportionately more-uneducated (educated) individuals.
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change over time. We improve on these approaches by combining them all and using
fixed effects to account for the potential problems mentioned earlier. Our empirical
strategy compares migration decisions of (1) different cohorts from the same country
who were exposed to different educational polices because of policy changes, and (2)
identical cohorts from different countries who were exposed to different educational
policies because of differences in legislation across countries. Using fixed effects, this
strategy allows us to control for confounding factors that vary across age, time, and
countries, and across pairwise combinations of age and time and countries and time. As
a result, our estimated coefficients arise from refined comparisons of cohorts, and they
are robust to the potential influence of a long list of unobserved factors.
To assess the effect of changes to the length of compulsory schooling on migration,
we estimate the following model:
ma;i;t ¼ α0 þ α1CSa;i;t þ α2La;i;t þ α3Xa;i;t1 þ α4EUa;i;t þ α5Da þ α6Di
þα7Dt þ α8Da;t þ α9Di;t þ εa;i;t; ð1Þ
where ma,i,t is the natural logarithm of the number of individuals of age a who migrate
from country i in year t. CSa,i,t denotes the number of years of compulsory schooling
that individuals who are of age a in year t faced in country i when they were younger,
and La,i,t are indicator variables that take on a value of 1 if these individuals were taught
foreign languages during their compulsory education. We include these last controls
because exposure to foreign language classes during compulsory education has been
linked to increased migration flows of affected cohorts to countries where these
languages are spoken (see Aparicio Fenoll and Kuehn 2016).8 Because only certain
European languages are studied during compulsory education, our set is restricted to
English, German, French, Spanish, and Italian.9 Xa,i,t – 1 are control variables, such as
total population, the stock of migrants from country i living in other European
countries, and the difference in unemployment rates between country i and other
European countries. All three variables are measured in t – 1, and we include them
disaggregated by age group. Although gravity models of migration typically include
differences in GDP per capita across countries as explanatory variables, such differ-
ences in our specification are captured by interaction terms of year and country dummy
variables. Including differences in unemployment rates by age group allows us to
capture the fact that countries’ relative economic attractiveness might vary by cohort.
Following Bertrand et al. (2004), we cluster standard errors at the country level to allow
for serial correlation in migration outflows over time.
8 For countries where students can choose among foreign languages, we consider all options for two reasons.
First, for most of these countries, we do not have information on languages chosen by each cohort. Second, we
wish to avoid measuring individual choices, which would turn foreign languages into a bad control. Limited
reliability of data on years of exposure to foreign language classes is the main reason why we do not consider
such a refinement.
9 Russian is the most widely taught second foreign language in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, but we ignore
this option given that we do not have data on migration flows to Russia. Although individuals in Finland and
Belgium can additionally study Swedish and Dutch, respectively, we do not include these options explicitly
given that they apply to all cohorts and are hence indistinguishable from country fixed effects. The same holds
true for any controls accounting for the fact that some countries—such as the UK and Ireland, or Germany and
Austria—share the same official language.
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We also include as a control variable the number of years that individuals in country
i who are of age a in year t have lived in the EU (EUa,i,t). Joining the EU implies that
migration costs for citizens of new member countries are significantly reduced. How
this affects their migration decisions depends on their age and on how many years of
their working lives they could still spend in a different EU country. Hence, different
migration patterns for different cohorts could arise. Including the variable EUa,i,t
ensures that we are not erroneously attributing changes in migration patterns
caused by a country’s EU membership to changes in the length of compulsory
education. Furthermore, the European context and our period of analysis (2008–
2012) also call for the inclusion of interaction terms of country and year dummy
variables, particularly because in 2009 and 2011, work restrictions in some
countries for nationals of Central European countries that joined the EU in 2004
and 2007, respectively, were finally lifted.10
Our identification strategy makes use of the fact that education reforms that changed
the length of compulsory schooling during the twentieth century for different cohorts
generate within- and across-country variation. Figure 1 displays an example. Consider
the situation of four individuals: A, B, C, and D. Individuals A and B are Portuguese
citizens and were born in 1968 and 1985, respectively, while individuals C and D, also
born in 1968 and 1985, are from Denmark. In Portugal in 1986, the length of
compulsory schooling increased from six to nine years. Given a school entry age of
6, all individuals age 6 or younger in 1986—those born in 1980 or later—were affected
by this reform. Individual B is hence assigned nine years of compulsory education,
while individual A is assigned six years. In Denmark, on the other hand, the length of
compulsory schooling increased from seven to nine years in 1971. Given a school entry
age of 7, all individuals age 7 or younger in 1971—that is, those born in 1964 or later—
were affected. Hence, both individuals from Denmark are assigned the same length of
compulsory schooling of nine years. Controlling for a large variety of other potential
determinants of migration, our main estimation then tests whether differences in the
length of compulsory schooling have an effect on cohorts’ subsequent migration
decisions.
Although one expects additional years of compulsory schooling to lead to higher
educational attainment, this need not be the case. Reforms might not be enforced, or
even prior to reforms, individuals could already be staying in school beyond the
minimum years required by law. To test whether changes to the length of compulsory
schooling have an effect on actual educational attainment, we run the following
regression:
YSa;i ¼ α0 þ α1CSa;i þ α2La;i þ α3Xa;i þ α4EUa;i þ α5Da þ α6Di þ εa;i; ð2Þ
where YSa,i denotes the average years of schooling of individuals of age a who live
in country i. Variables on the right side of the equation are as defined before, but
they lack the time dimension because we have information on average years of
schooling for only one year (2010). Otherwise, by including the same controls as
in our main specification, we make this regression as comparable to a first-stage
estimation as possible.
10 When in place, these restrictions applied to individuals of all ages.
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Finally, to test for the potential endogeneity of education reforms, we run two
regressions. First, Landes and Solmon (1972) proposed addressing endogeneity issues
of education reforms by testing whether compulsory schooling laws can “predict” past
educational attainment. If so, the authors argued, then exogeneity would not hold, and
causality would be likely to run from educational attainment to compulsory schooling.
Because our research question considers the effect of compulsory schooling laws on
migration, our main concern is the exogeneity of education laws with respect to
migration. To test for it, we estimate the following regression:
Ei;τ−10 ¼ α0 þ α1CSi;τ þ α2Yi;τ þ α3ΔYi;τ−10 þ α4Di þ α5Dτ þ εi;τ−10; ð3Þ
where Ei , τ − 10 denotes country i’s emigration rate measured 10 years prior to the
reform passed in τ. Yi , τ represents socioeconomic variables (GDP per capita, popula-
tion growth, log of migration, share of the urban population, and average years of
schooling) measured at the time of the reform, andΔYi , τ − 10 are their 10-year variation
rates. Dummy variables for reform years are denoted by Dτ. Although exogeneity of
education reforms with respect to educational attainment in our context is of secondary
importance, we also rerun the estimation with country i’s average educational attain-
ment 10 years prior to the reform as the dependent variable.
Second, in the spirit of Lleras-Muney (2002), we explore the potential determinants
of compulsory schooling laws by running the following regression:
CSi;τ ¼ α0 þ α1Yi;τ þ α2ΔYi;τ−5 þ α3ΔYi;τ−10 þ α4Di þ α5Dτ þ εi;τ; ð4Þ
where CSi , τ are years of compulsory schooling that were passed in year τ, and we test
for relationships with socioeconomic variables and their 5- and 10-year variation rates.
Data
For our analysis, we use Eurostat data on immigration by five-year age groups and
citizenship for 2008–2012, available for all 28 EU countries plus Norway,
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Fig. 1 Identification strategy: Example
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Liechtenstein, and Macedonia. In particular, we construct migrant outflows for each
year by summing the number of citizens of each country who leave for any of the
following destination countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. For arrivals in
Germany and Austria, missing data for 2009–2012 and 2010, respectively, are
complemented with data from the Statistische Bundesamt and Statistik Austria. Data
on migrants who arrive in the UK come from the International Passenger Survey of the
Office for National Statistics (ONS). We also rely on Eurostat for data on national
unemployment rates, total population, and the stock of migrants by country of origin.
These three variables are considered disaggregated by five-year age groups and are
measured one year prior to migration—that is, in 2007–2011.
We restrict our sample to young individuals aged 25–44, who are most likely to
migrate for work-related reasons. We exclude individuals younger than age 25 because
it is difficult to disentangle migration from education decisions for this group, partic-
ularly in the presence of a large-scale EU program (Erasmus) that provides subsidies for
studying abroad.11 Regarding older workers, the number of years that individuals have
to work to become eligible for pension payments varies widely across countries: for
example, France and Spain require 15 years, while Germany requires 5 years. Hence,
for older individuals, such policy aspects that are unrelated to individuals’ educational
attainment might influence their migration decisions.
Our database on compulsory schooling reforms that includes information on the
length of compulsory education for each cohort in each country is mainly based on the
following four sources: Brunello et al. (2009), Garrouste (2010), Hörner et al. (2007),
and Murtin and Viarengo (2011). The assignment of years of compulsory schooling to
age groups is not always straightforward. Thus, for age groups in which only some
individuals were affected by changes to compulsory education, we construct a weighted
average for years of compulsory schooling.12 As weights, we use the number of
individuals of each exact age within the age group, which we obtain from Eurostat.
Table S1 in Online Resource 1 displays all effective changes to the length of compul-
sory education for cohorts in our sample. A detailed description of these education
reforms for all countries (including countries where no effective changes occurred) can
be found in section A.1 of Online Resource 1. As mentioned earlier, our database also
includes information on reforms regarding foreign languages in compulsory school
curricula. For each cohort and country, we have information, mainly from the European
Commission’s Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (Eurydice),
regarding the starting age for studying foreign languages during compulsory education
as well as the specific languages studied. We summarize this information in Table S2 in
Online Resource 1; in section A.1 of the online supplement, we describe these reforms
in more detail.
11 For 2007–2013, the EU allocated €3.1 billion to the Erasmus program.
12 One potential concern could be that individuals did not obtain their schooling in their country of origin.
However, using data by citizenship, instead of country of previous residence, mitigates this concern
substantially.
2188 A. Aparicio Fenoll, Z. Kuehn
Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/demography/article-pdf/54/6/2181/840830/2181apariciofenoll.pdf
by UNIV STUDI DI TORINO user
on 03 March 2021
For our estimation that tests whether education reforms were effective at increasing
educational attainment, we consider data on average years of education for each age
group from Barro and Lee (2013) for 2010.13 For our exogeneity checks, we have data
on migration outflows from various editions of the United Nations Statistical
Yearbooks, available for 1950–1995 for 24 of the 31 countries in our sample.14 We
use data from the OECD for GDP per capita, which are available beginning with 1960.
However, for former communist countries (such as the Czech Republic, Croatia,
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), this series starts only in 1990. To avoid
losing observations, we hence set missing values for GDP per capita for 1960–1989 for
these countries to 0, and we define an indicator variable for missing data. Finally, we
again rely on data from Barro and Lee (2013) for past educational attainment and on
World Bank data for population growth and the percentage of the population living in
urban areas. These last three variables are available from 1960 onward for all countries
except Macedonia. Thus, our final sample for the exogeneity check includes 23
countries.15
Table 1 provides summary statistics for all our variables. For the variables included
in our main specification, we have observations for 620 cells defined by the combina-
tion of country, age group, and year. On average, 4,163 individuals in each age group
from each country migrate each year. However, we observe significant variation in
these migration flows. For instance, in 2009, only 1 individual aged 40–44 migrated
from Liechtenstein, while 54,766 individuals aged 25–29 migrated from Poland.
Average years of compulsory schooling are 9 years, ranging from 6 years (for older
cohorts in most countries) to 13 years for younger cohorts in Germany. We observe a
maximum difference of 32 percentage points in 2008 between Macedonia’s unemploy-
ment rate for individuals aged 25–29 and unemployment for the same age group in
other European countries. Other control variables that we include into our main
specification, disaggregated by age group and measured one year before migration,
are the stock of migrants in other European countries and total population. Regarding
the latter, each country has, on average, a little more than 1 million inhabitants per age
group, ranging from only 2,224 individuals aged 25–29 in Liechtenstein to more than 7
million individuals aged 35–39 in Germany in 2008. Regarding the stock of migrants,
13 Unfortunately, we cannot exploit changes over time because these data are available only every five years.
Barro and Lee (2013) provided data for all countries in our sample except for Liechtenstein.
14 We use the following editions: 1952, 1954, 1957, 1959, 1962, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1977, 1985, 1989, and
1996. For Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia, we use data for Yugoslavia that are available for 1956–1977. For
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, data for Czechoslovakia are used until 1992. Because no data on emigration
from the USSR are available, we cannot assign data to Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania. Data for Bulgaria,
Romania, and Liechtenstein are only sporadically available, and numbers for emigration flows from Ireland
exceed those of the Irish population; hence, we do not include any of these countries. For Spain, Norway,
Finland, and the UK, data before 1962, before 1960, for 1960–1966, and for 1961–1963, respectively, could
not be used because they included only intercontinental migration in the case of Spain; excluded migration to
other Scandinavian countries; or in the case of the UK, referred only to migration to other Commonwealth
countries.
15 Aggregate migration outflow data are available for 24 countries from 1950–1995, but data for all other
control variables are not available for Macedonia, and for all other countries only from 1960 onward. The final
sample for the exogeneity check includes the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
Compulsory Schooling Laws and Migration 2189
Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/demography/article-pdf/54/6/2181/840830/2181apariciofenoll.pdf
by UNIV STUDI DI TORINO user
on 03 March 2021
Table 1 Summary statistics
Variable Mean SD Min. Max.
Main Variables
Emigration outflow by origin, age, and year 4,163.1 6,596.9 1 54,766
Years of compulsory education 9.07 1.17 6 13
Age group
25–29 0.25 0.433 0 1
30–34 0.25 0.433 0 1
40–44 0.25 0.433 0 1
Year
2008 0.2 0.4 0 1
2009 0.2 0.4 0 1
2011 0.2 0.4 0 1
2012 0.2 0.4 0 1
Difference in unemployment, all EU destinations by age 0.00 5.86 –10.23 31.75
Stock immigrants in all EU destinations by age 34,608 57,552 52 407,107
Stock population in origin by age 1,166,457 1,554,559 2,224 7,176,550
Compulsory foreign language classes 0.77 0.41 0 1
English 0.67 0.46 0 1
German 0.47 0.49 0 1
French 0.42 0.48 0 1
Spanish 0.10 0.28 0 1
Italian 0.09 0.27 0 1
Years lived in the EU 15.01 14.04 0 46.50
N = 620
Pseudo-First Stage
Average years of schooling by cohort, 2010 12.094 0.998 8.556 14.187
N = 116
Exogeneity Checks: 23 Countries (1960–1995)
Reforms: Length of compulsory schooling 9.08 1.34 6.00 13.00
Emigrants (logs) 9.46 2.24 0.69 14.03
Population growth (annual %) 0.49 0.49 –0.89 3.80
Urban population (% of total population) 70.32 13.83 37.00 96.78
Average years of schooling by cohort 7.98 1.60 2.93 11.24
GDP per capitaa 11,573 6,696 1,980 41,014
5-year variation rates
Emigrants (logs) –0.30 0.82 –4.26 1.58
Population growth –0.01 0.54 –2.72 4.69
Urban population 0.04 0.04 –0.01 0.27
Average years of schooling by cohort 0.08 0.06 –0.05 0.30
GDP per capitab 0.46 0.16 0.06 0.75
10-year variation rates
Emigrants (logs) –0.48 1.12 –6.79 2.30
Population growth –0.10 0.72 –4.55 4.21
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each country has on average approximately 34,607 individuals of each age group living
in other European countries—that is, more than eight times the average annual outflow.
However, although only 52 individuals aged 40–44 from Liechtenstein were resid-
ing abroad in 2011, the stock of migrants from Romania aged 30–34 in other European
countries was 407,107 in 2012. Finally, we also include indicator variables for cohorts
who were exposed to different foreign languages during their compulsory education.
More than two-thirds of individuals in our sample potentially learned English, followed
by 47 % and 43 % who could have learned German or French, respectively. Only
recently, individuals in most countries can also choose Spanish or Italian as compulsory
foreign languages, affecting less than 10 % of individuals in our sample.
Results
We first test whether changes to the length of compulsory schooling have an effect on
actual educational attainment (see Eq. (2)). As mentioned earlier, we do not conduct a
two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation, but we make the regression as comparable to
a first-stage estimation as possible.16 In particular, we regress average educational
attainment for different age groups on our measure of years of compulsory schooling,
and we control for the same variables as in our main specification. Table S3 in Online
Resource 1 shows the results. The estimated coefficients indicate that policies that
increased the length of compulsory schooling were effective at increasing average years
of education of affected cohorts. Given that already prior to reforms, individuals could
have been staying in school longer, the increase is less than proportional. In particular,
we find that one additional year of compulsory schooling increases average educational
attainment of affected cohorts by 0.26 years. Our estimate thus is close to the additional
0.2 and 0.23 years that Oreopoulos (2007) estimated for an increase in the school-
Table 1 (continued)
Variable Mean SD Min. Max.
Urban population 0.08 0.09 –0.02 0.51
Average years of schooling by cohort 0.17 0.12 –0.12 0.59
GDP per capitac 1.14 0.34 0.45 1.94
N = 492
Notes: Unemployment rates, stock of immigrants, and population by age group refer to years t – 1 (i.e., 2007–
2011). Five- and 10-year variation rates are defined as % changes with the exception of log-migration and




16 Running a 2SLS IV estimation with data for 2010 only results in a negative and significant estimate of the
impact of education on migration. However, because of the reduced sample size, the instrument is weak
according to the Stock and Yogo (2005) criterion. Furthermore, as mentioned in the Introduction, it is not clear
that compulsory schooling reforms affect migration only via educational attainment, something that would
invalidate the exclusion restriction.
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leaving age from 15 to 16 years in the United States and Canada, respectively. Thus, part
of the effect of compulsory schooling reforms on indirectly related outcomes, such as
migration, operates through changes in educational attainment.
We then turn to our main model, as specified in Eq. (1), which estimates the effect of
changes to the length of compulsory education on migration. Results are displayed in
Table 2. The first column corresponds to the basic regression that includes dummy
variables for year, age group, and countries; lagged control variables for unemploy-
ment differences, stock of migrants, and population by age group; dummy vari-
ables for compulsory foreign language classes; and the number of years individ-
uals have lived in the EU. In column 2, we add the interaction term for age and
year. Column 3 presents results for the most complete specification that also
includes the interaction term between country and year. Our coefficient of interest
is negative, significant, and very stable across all specifications. One additional
year of compulsory schooling reduces the number of individuals from the affected
cohorts who migrate in a given year by 9 %.
Having been exposed to English, French, German, Italian, or Spanish during
compulsory education affects the odds of migrating to particular European countries
(see Aparicio Fenoll and Kuehn 2016) but does not significantly affect the general odds
of migrating. Table S4 in Online Resource 1 displays the full set of estimated
coefficients. After we control for macroeconomic and cohort-specific factors by in-
cluding age-by-year and country-by-year dummy variables, age-specific controls do
not play a significant role; see column 3. Coefficients in columns 1 and 2, when
significant, show the expected signs. Higher unemployment rates and larger cohorts are
related to more out-migration. On the other hand, older cohorts in countries that have
been in the EU longer migrate less; and as more individuals of a cohort leave, the
number of emigrants falls.17
Discussion
Why would additional years of compulsory schooling reduce migration? One potential
explanation is linked to the fact that an increase in the length of compulsory schooling
shifts a significant fraction of the population from low to medium educational attain-
ment, and medium-educated individuals display lower emigration rates compared with
low-educated individuals in the majority of European countries. However, this opens
up a second question: Why do medium educated individuals migrate less? Or, put
differently, Why would returns to migration be higher for primary- and tertiary-
educated individuals (i.e., at both tails of the education distribution)?
Several aspects could explain such a pattern in returns to migration. First, the median
voter in most European countries has an intermediate level of education (see Fig. S2).
As a result, labor market regulations in each country are likely to be tailored to
medium-educated individuals. McHenry (2013), who found compulsory schooling to
17 The presence of network effects could imply that as more individuals leave, more follow. However bear in
mind that unlike the literature’s typical example regarding Mexican-U.S. migration, the stock of immigrants in
our case is spread over 30 countries. The negative coefficient is in line with the notion that after a large fraction
of an age group has migrated, those who remain have a much lower propensity to leave.
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reduce mobility across U.S. states, suggested that staying in school allows individuals
to strengthen their community networks, which might help them find jobs. Low- and
high-educated individuals, on the other hand, could find foreign labor markets rela-
tively more appealing. For instance, low-educated individuals could migrate to coun-
tries that offer higher minimum wages, better public services, and higher social
benefits, as argued by the literature on welfare magnets initiated by Borjas (1999).
Highly educated individuals could be responding more strongly to demand for their
skills in foreign labor markets and/or so-called brain gain policies that some countries
implement to attract highly skilled and talented individuals (e.g., researchers); see
Giannoccolo (2012) or Mahroum (2005) for a survey of such policies in Europe and
OECD countries, respectively.
Second, the model in Stark (1991: chapter 11) proposed a different mechanism that
can give rise to a U-shaped pattern of returns to migration. The model is based on the
facts that educational degrees are not automatically valid across countries and that
degree recognition is costly in terms of time and money. In such an environment, only
highly educated individuals find it worthwhile to pay the cost of degree recognition.
For medium-educated individuals, on the other hand, the costs are too high relative to
the additional wage they could obtain abroad; and without a recognized degree, they are
able to earn only a minimum wage in the destination country. Hence, when a minimum
wage and a higher wage level exist in some destination countries but wages are
increasing in education in both destination and origin countries, a U-shaped pattern
for migration can arise: individuals with higher education have their degree recognized
and migrate, medium-educated individuals stay, and low-educated individuals migrate
to earn the minimum wage of the destination country. The model’s outcome is hence in
line with European data on lower emigration rates of secondary-educated compared
with both primary- or tertiary-educated individuals. The model also suggests a potential
mechanism for our findings.
However, reasons unrelated to individuals’ educational attainment could also ex-
plain why laws that increase the length of compulsory education might lead to less
Table 2 Migration and years of compulsory schooling
(1) (2) (3)
Years of Compulsory Schooling –0.098* (0.039) –0.100* (0.041) –0.090* (0.041)
Age by Year Dummy Variables No Yes Yes
Country by Year Dummy Variables No No Yes
Number of Observations 620 620 620
R2 .923 .924 .98
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of individuals from a certain age group
and country migrating in one year. The variable years of compulsory schooling refers to the weighted average
of compulsory schooling faced by the corresponding age group, with weights defined by the number of
individuals of each exact age. All regressions contain year fixed effects, age indicators, country dummy
variables, a variable for lagged age-specific differences in unemployment rates, the lagged population size of
the age group, the lagged stock of migrants from each country by age group, and dummy variables for
exposure to compulsory foreign language classes, as well as the number of years individuals have lived in the
EU. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered by country.
*p ≤ .05
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migration by affected cohorts. As Eisenberg (1988) described, typical arguments in
favor of compulsory schooling laws in the United States during the nineteenth century
suggested that such laws would lead to improved civic societies and would thus entail
reductions in crime rates. These laws made schooling compulsory, and they are
therefore different from reforms considered here that change the length of compulsory
education. Nevertheless, cohorts affected by additional years of compulsory education
will also live surrounded by better-educated peers, which for similar reasons could
potentially reduce out-migration. Finally, increases in the length of compulsory school-
ing require hiring additional teachers. This implies improved local labor market
opportunities and incomes, mostly for the parental generation of affected cohorts, and
growing up under better economic circumstances could make these cohorts less likely
to migrate.
Endogeneity Concern
Since the seminal study by Angrist and Krueger (1991), compulsory schooling laws
have been used in studies of the causal relationship between education and many
outcomes, such as earnings (Harmon and Walker 1995), health (Brunello et al. 2013),
and citizenship (Milligan et al. 2004). More relevant to the current study and as
discussed earlier, changes in the length of compulsory education have also been used
in analyses of the effect of education on internal migration in Norway (Machin et al.
2012) and the United States (Malamud and Wozniak 2010a; McHenry 2013).
Exogeneity with respect to educational attainment is a necessary condition for these
approaches to be valid. Previous studies have found mixed results regarding the
exogeneity of compulsory schooling laws. Lleras-Muney (2002) for U.S. laws passed
between 1915 and 1939, and Nasif Edwards (1978) for U.S. laws passed in 1960,
established that those were exogenous to educational attainment. However, studies of
other periods in U.S. history found that compulsory law changes might have been
endogenous to educational attainment (e.g., for 1940–1955, see Eisenberg 1988;
Landes and Solmon 1972; Nasif Edwards 1978; Stigler 1950: appendix B). Given these
mixed results and that, to the best of our knowledge, there are no studies regarding the
exogeneity of compulsory schooling laws in Europe, we formally address this issue.
Education reforms could be endogenous to migration or educational attainment in two
ways: (1) reverse causality, if education reforms were enacted because of past migration
outflows or past educational attainment, and (2) omitted variables, if determinants of
cohort-specific migration patterns (e.g., differences in cohort-specific labor market
conditions between origin and destination countries) persisted over time and had influ-
enced reforms that were implemented when our cohorts were in school. Regarding
reverse causality, education reforms are predetermined with respect to migration patterns
in 2008–2012, but migration patterns could be highly persistent over time. However,
education reforms could at most be driven by aggregate migration, whereas our approach
considers cohort-specific migration flows. Still, it is possible that compulsory schooling
reforms took place in countries that were exhibiting certain long-term trends in educa-
tional attainment for reasons unrelated to education reforms. Therefore, we follow
Aaronson and Mazumder (2011) by including country-specific birth-cohort trends into
our main specification. Results in Table S5 in Online Resource 1 show that the estimated
coefficient of interest is not significantly different from the one in our main regression.
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From a political economy point of view, migration flows are unlikely to influence
education policies. As discussed earlier, governments design their education policies
focusing on the median voter who stays, instead of targeting those who migrate.
Moreover, the time between the implementation of education reforms and students’
completion of compulsory education and entry into the labor market—be it at home or
abroad—is likely to exceed governments’ mandates. Hence, because governments
might not be able to reap the potential fruits in terms of more or less migration,
migration flows or brain drain concerns are very unlikely determinants of policies
affecting compulsory education.18 However, as Eisenberg (1988) noted, laws introduc-
ing compulsory schooling in the United States in the 1880s were passed after opposi-
tion to such laws was limited.19 To formally test for the potential endogeneity of the
passage of compulsory schooling laws, we follow Landes and Solmon (1972). Using a
broader set of reforms, including those that did not imply changes to compulsory
schoolings for cohorts in our sample (see Table S6, Online Resource 1), we estimate
Eq. (3) and check whether reforms are able to predict past migration rates or past
educational attainment. Results displayed in Table 3 show that none of the estimated
coefficients are significant at the 10 % level. Hence, we find no evidence that
compulsory education reforms in Europe were passed as a reaction to changes in
migration or educational attainment.
Regarding omitted variables, to proxy labor market conditions in our specification,
we control for differences in cohort-specific unemployment rates in the year before
migration. Our estimated coefficients remain unchanged, suggesting that differences in
labor market conditions between countries are not driving education reforms imple-
mented in the past. One might think that unemployment rates at the time of the reform
could be a relevant omitted variable; however, those are unlikely to affect migration
patterns in 2008–2012, particularly after contemporaneous unemployment is controlled
for. In general, to address these concerns, one would like to know more about the
determinants of education reforms.20
To this end, our exogeneity check, following Lleras-Muney (2002) and as specified
in Eq. (4), tests which variables are correlated with changes in the length of compulsory
schooling. Again, we use the broader set of reforms (see Table S6, Online Resource 1)
and regress the length of compulsory schooling on a variety of potentially related
variables measured in the reform year regarding demographics (log migration out-flow,
population growth), urban development (percentage urban population), education
(average years of schooling), and economic development (GDP per capita). We also
include 5- and 10-year variation rates for all variables, as well as year and country fixed
effects. Table 4 shows the results from this estimation. We estimate a significant
relationship between the timing of compulsory schooling reforms and the growth rate
18 To our knowledge, the only example of a government explicitly providing training such that its citizens
become better migrant workers is the training of nurses in the Philippines (see Lorenzo et al. 2007). However,
the effect of such specialized training of adult workers on migration is much more immediate than the one
resulting from education reforms regarding compulsory schooling.
19 Opposition tended to arise because of limitations to child labor and parental freedom of decision, as well as
taxation for financing schools; see Eisenberg (1988) and Butts and Cremin (1953).
20 To the best of our knowledge, no established theory in political economy addresses education reforms.
However, increasing the length of compulsory education requires additional resources, such as teachers and
facilities. Thus, the actual implementation of those reforms depends on the availability of resources.
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in urban population 10 years prior to reforms. To ensure that our main result is not
altered by this relationship, we conduct two robustness checks. First, we check which
countries are driving this result and rerun our main estimation excluding them (Malta,
Norway, Portugal, and Sweden). Our results remain robust (see Table S7, Online
Resource 1). Second, we include as an additional control variable into our main
regression the 10-year variation rate in urban population measured at the time each
cohort entered compulsory schooling. Results displayed in Table S8 of Online
Resource 1 show that our coefficient of interest is not very different from the one in
our main specification.
Our results suggest that compulsory schooling laws that were passed during the
second half of the twentieth century in Europe are exogenous to changes in emigration
rates or educational attainment. However, we cannot rule out that changes in migration
rates or educational attainment led to governments adopting other policies that affected
returns to migration (e.g., certain labor market policies). Nevertheless, for our main
result to be due to alternative policies instead of education reforms, such policies would
have had to affect returns to migration of different cohorts distinctively, and they also
would have had to occur simultaneously with education reforms.
Other Robustness Checks
After the end of communism, some countries in Central and Eastern Europe split.
However, they share a common past, including education reforms that occurred before
1990. To account for this, we cluster standard errors by country using the following




Years of compulsory schooling 0.156 (0.124) 0.046 (0.15) 0.111 (0.124)
Contemporaneous controls Yes No Yes
Controls: 10-year variation rate No Yes Yes
Number of observations 710 546 546
R2 .837 .862 .880
B. Educational Attainment
Years of compulsory schooling –0.028 (0.069) –0.004 (0.065) –0.024 (0.06)
Contemporaneous controls Yes No Yes
Controls: 10-year variation rate No Yes Yes
Number of observations 513 492 492
R2 .956 .952 .958
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of outmigration in panel A and average years of education
measured 10 years before the reform in panel B. All regressions include dummy variables for year and
country. Contemporaneous controls are logarithm of outmigration, population growth, urban over total
population, GDP per capita, and average years of schooling, as well as their variation rates over the past 10
years. In panel A, we exclude the variation rate of the logarithm of outmigration; in panel B, we exclude
average years of education. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered by country.
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country definitions pertinent to 1990: (1) the Soviet Union (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania),
(2) Yugoslavia (Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia), and (3) Czechoslovakia
(Czech Republic and Slovakia). Table S9 shows that results from this estimation are
almost indistinguishable from those in our main specification. In the wake of this same
event, some of these countries reduced the length of compulsory schooling. Given that
the end of the Cold War also led to important migration outflows, one might wonder
whether such reductions in compulsory schooling could be driving our results.
However, this would be possible only if differences in migration outflows by age
group persisted to the present. We rerun our main estimation excluding all countries
that reduced the length of compulsory schooling at some point in time (see Table S10,
Online Resource 1). Our coefficient of interest is somewhat smaller, but the difference
is not statistically significant.
As mentioned earlier, four countries in our sample (Croatia, Liechtenstein,
Macedonia, and Norway) did not belong to the EU during 2008–2012 and hence
might have faced different migration restrictions than other countries in our
sample. We repeat our estimation excluding these countries. Table S11 shows that
results remain robust. Finally, evidence suggests that some countries implemented
reforms gradually over many years. In this case, our assignment of years of
compulsory education to cohorts is somewhat inaccurate. Maybe not surprisingly,
Table 4 Exogeneity check: Timing and content of education reforms
(1) (2) (3)
GDP per Capita –1.00e–05 (0.00002) –0.00003 (0.00002) –0.00003 (0.00003)
Population Growth (%) 0.205 (0.254) 0.173 (0.322) 0.067 (0.321)
Urban Population (%) 0.048 (0.038) 0.034 (0.037) 0.028 (0.037)
Out-migration (log) 0.072 (0.197) 0.101 (0.195)
Average Years of Schooling 0.253 (0.314)
5-Year Variation Rates
GDP per capita 0.707 (0.586) 0.812 (0.940) 0.630 (1.052)
Population growth (%) –0.225 (0.228) –0.195 (0.238) –0.136 (0.229)
Urban population (%) 2.784 (3.169) 1.641 (3.864) 2.534 (3.947)
Out-migration (log) 0.080 (0.114) 0.086 (0.103)
10-Year Variation Rates
GDP per capita –0.115 (0.384) –0.202 (0.538) –0.150 (0.580)
Population growth (%) 0.025 (0.109) 0.043 (0.113) 0.078 (0.106)
Urban population (%) 4.034 (2.462) 5.468† (2.867) 4.997† (2.863)
Out-migration (log) –0.050 (0.176) –0.089 (0.176)
Average years of schooling 0.246 (1.388)
Number of Observations 587 492 492
R2 .746 .755 .757
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of years of compulsory schooling in force in a particular year. All
regressions include dummy variables for year and country. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered
by country.
†p ≤ .10
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when we run our main estimation excluding those countries (Norway and
Finland), our coefficients are somewhat larger, although the difference is not
statistically significant (see Table S12).
Conclusion
Previous research has used education reforms to test whether more education is
associated with more or less within-country mobility, finding mixed results. We
consider an international context with basically unrestricted mobility—namely,
Europe—and test for the direct effect of education policies on migration. We
show that increases in the length of compulsory schooling reduce the propensity
to migrate across European countries. One additional year of compulsory educa-
tion reduces migration of affected cohorts in a given year by 9 %. After we
perform a variety of exogeneity checks, our results show that European lawmakers
did not pass education reforms as a reaction to changes in migration rates or
educational attainment.
We also find that additional years of compulsory education effectively translated into
higher average educational attainment, and hence part of the effect of compulsory
schooling reforms on migration operates through changes in educational attainment. In
this context, identification comes from individuals at the low to medium part of the
education distribution, whose educational attainment changes as a result of the reforms
(the so-called compliers). Hence, although our results show that governments can be
fairly confident that more years of compulsory schooling are unlikely to be lost to brain
drain, this might not apply to reforms of higher education. How education policies that
alter individuals’ propensity to go into higher education affect migration choices seems
an interesting question for future research.
In 2014, unemployment was 24 % to 26 % in Spain and Greece; Germany had one
of the lowest unemployment rates, at 5 %. European authorities are trying to foster
mobility to reduce such large differences. Machin et al. (2012) argued that lower
average educational attainment in Europe compared with the United States might be
a reason for the relatively low labor mobility in Europe. Our results, however, suggest
that different distributions of education matter—in particular, the higher share of
medium-educated individuals in Europe compared with the United States.21 In this
context, if high degree recognition costs prevent medium-educated individuals from
migrating (see Stark 1991), then reducing those costs could be key for increasing
returns to migration and fostering mobility. Finally, one of the top priorities of the
European Union’s 2020 agenda is to improve educational outcomes. Education policies
that lead to a more-educated and better-prepared workforce are essential for future
growth and job creation. Our results show that increasing educational attainment while
increasing labor mobility across countries requires coordinated education and labor
market policies.22
21 Alternative explanations for the low European mobility focus on relatively high unemployment benefits
(Antolin and Bover 1997) and stronger employment protection (Belot 2007) in European countries compared
with the United States.
22 Boldrin and Canova (2001) argued that EU policies aimed at achieving convergence in economic
conditions across Europe seem to discourage migration.
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